Right To Die :: essays research papers fc

In hindquarters A. Robertsons essay, "Cruzan No Rights Violated," he argues that the decision made by the Missouri commanding Court to deny Nancy Beth Cruzans parents request to have their daughters artificial nutrition and hydration thermionic valve removed was non a violation of Nancy Beth Cruzans amend to bend intercession because she had not somebodyally refused intervention. Robertson also claims that keeping Cruzan alive with this particular medical examination treatment does not alienate her constitutional rights, or her parents. Robertson resigns that, " A for good vegetative patient does not have interests that can be harmed," patently because he/she cannot feel pain and doesnt know his/her present condition. Robertson then goes on to say that simply assuming that one would decline treatment in that situation because of his/her prior beliefs is not enough evidence to maintain that the directing was, in fact, released by the said person, and to r elieve their self from a state law that orders such a treatment, the person must have released a directive against that particular treatment. If one were to argue that an incompetent patient has the right to have their medical treatment nail downd by another person on the presumption that it follows with the patients previous beliefs, Robertson would declare that the patient is much incompatible than they were in advance and does not reserve a constitutional right to be managed in the same way they would have been. In placing the right to decide Nancys treatment in her parents hands, her parents would be acting in their own interests fit to Robertson, and in choosing to stop medical treatment of their daughter, they would be denying their child medical care deemed necessary by the state, which is illegal. With this in mind, Robertson says that the Supreme Court should not extend a familys privacy to include the refusal of necessary treatment when the above treatment is not causi ng harm to the child. Next Robertson says that if a person wants to refuse treatment while incompetent, it is their obligation to make a directive before becoming incompetent in order to refuse treatment on the principle of that particular directive, and that requiring this is "not an undue burden on persons who propensity to issue directives against medical care when incompetent." If "clear evidence" does not subsist in a past directive, Robertson says that providing the treatment does not alienate a persons right to regulate his/her own care because of the lack of evidence.